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Saddam Hussein - Source: Reuters -
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British intelligence in the days ahead of the 2003 US-led
invasion of Iraq signalled that Saddam Hussein's forces did not
have the capability to deploy chemical weapons, senior officials
said.
The Iraq Inquiry heard an official dossier to justify war that said
Saddam could launch weapons of mass destruction within 45 minutes
was understood by British security circles to refer to battlefield
chemical weapons and not ballistic missiles.
There had been scant new intelligence about Iraq's weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) programme since UN inspectors left the country in
1998, although it was assumed Saddam would step up efforts to
obtain such weapons, the officials said.
Tim Dowse, Head of Counter Proliferation at the Foreign Office in
2001, and William Ehrman, who was Director International Security,
said they believed Iraq's nuclear weapons ambitions had been
contained by sanctions.
The second day of the inquiry heard officials had been more
concerned about Iraq's bid to acquire more chemical and biological
weapons (CBW), although evidence suggested its arsenal had been
destroyed in the 1990s.
"We did in the very final days before military action receive some
(intelligence) on CBW use that it was disassembled, that he might
not have the munitions to deliver it," Ehrman told the
inquiry.
He said other evidence, including that from UN weapons inspectors
who had been in Iraq before the 2003 war, had previously backed up
fears Iraqi forces had chemical and biological weapons.
Battlefield weapons
The officials were also asked specifically about the government
statement that Saddam could deploy WMDs within 45 minutes.
It was widely believed to mean Iraq could strike against
neighbouring countries, but no such weapons were found.
Dowse said when he saw the report he assumed this referred to
battlefield weapons, and not missiles that could be fired at other
states.
"I don't think we ever said that it was for use for a ballistic
missile in that way," he said.
"Speaking personally, when I saw the 45 minutes report, I did not
give it particular significance because it didn't seem out of line
with what we generally assessed to be Iraq's intentions and
capabilities with regard to chemical weapons.
"It subsequently took on a rather iconic status that I don't think
those of us who saw the initial report really gave it. It wasn't
surprising."
The officials also said while Saddam supported Palestinian militant
groups, there was little evidence of contact between al Qaeda and
Saddam's government over the spread of WMDs.
"We never found any evidence that chemical or biological material
had been passed by the Iraqi regime to terrorists," Ehrman
said.
Dowse said Saddam and al Qaeda were not allies.
"In fact, after 9/11 we concluded that the Iraqis had actually stepped further back. They didn't want to be associated with al Qaeda."
